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Introduction
There is a vast literature in political economy to explain the pattern of public spending. One strand of this literature focuses on the conception that the distribution of information in the electorate plays an important role for political outcomes. It is assumed that better informed voters receive favorable policies. Strömberg (2004a) examines the idea that mass media may be crucial because they considerably determine which groups are well-informed. In his model a newspaper reports more on issues concerning large groups, groups that are more attractive to advertising, and groups with a high value of information. These groups receive favorable policies. Strömberg (2004b) finds empirical evidence that mass media affect policies. He argues that voters are more likely to ballot for an incumbent if they know that the latter has done something for them. Thus, voters who are informed of the incumbent´s policy will be treated favorably.
Aware of this, we pose the question if geography effects media coverage and, consequently, the distribution of information. Since television is regarded as the primary source of news (Roper 1985) , we refer our analysis to this media sector: Let us assume that a profit-maximizing television station is located in a certain place -the media center -and its news can be received within a certain range around this place. This region is the TV station´s media market which may be composed of several counties. The news program consists of reports on events that happen somewhere in these counties. Apparently, a reporter team must be sent there to produce striking coverage. In case that the physical distance to the media center varies among counties, the costs of reporting from a county may not be equal for all counties. Given a sufficiently large media market one can think of several factors that raise costs: An obvious reason is that gas costs increase in distance. Just as well, one can argue that reporters might have easier access to information near the media center because of some network effect among journalists, or, more generally, among residents close to the center. Thus, reporters need to take less time and effort to tell a good story from less distant counties. Having the choice between two events which are equally important, e.g. they have the same marginal effect on revenues, the event that occurs closer to the center appears to be more attractive for reporting. Since, by assumption, limited airtime is confronted with a large number of events there may arise a bias in coverage which in turn may bias the distribution of information among counties. Assume that viewers favor news from their county and tend to switch to entertainment channels if there is only little coverage of their home-county. Thus, the share of viewers would be lower in these counties. Reconsidering the above-mentioned ideas, this would have an impact on policies as we will illustrate in a simple model. The prediction of the model, that geographic distance may affect policy via the media, will be tested in an empirical analysis of US county data.
We proceed as follows. The next section briefly overviews related literature. Then we present the model in section 3. Afterwards, we describe our data and estimation approach. Empirical results are presented in section 5. The last section concludes.
Related Literature
The idea that public spending among jurisdictions might not be driven mainly by equity and efficiency considerations as assumed in the traditional view of fiscal federalism but by politics has been pursued long time. Wright (1974) , as an example, examined New Deal spending in the 1930s and found that political variables explained spending patterns better than economic variables. Today, many studies on the allocation of governmental grants are based on the theoretical work of Weibull (1987, 1993) and Londregan (1996, 1998) , which marks relevant political variables for the allocation of grants. Henceforth we will call it the LW-DL-model. Case (2001) , Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003) tested the predictions of this model and find support for the hypothesis that politics matter for the regional distribution of grants. Case (2001) finds evidence that political competition affects the distribution of block grants from central to local governments in Albania as well as Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find support for tactical spending in Sweden. They apply data on a newly-created Swedish grant program to further ecological sustainable development. As the program allows the central government a high level of discretionary power concerning the distribution of grants across municipalities it should be very suitable to investigate if the money was used tactically to raise the probability of re-election. In particular, they underline that grants to communes with many swing voters were found to be significantly higher. Using a different data set from Sweden, Johansson (2003) provides ambiguous evidence about this key implication of the theory depending on the applied methodology but, in general, the results support the hypothesis that politics matter. Strömberg (2004b) uses a slightly different theoretical model when examining the hypothesis that better informed voters receive favorable politics. He argues that voters only consider received government spending in their voting decision if they know who is responsible for it. Strömberg applies data on FERA, a major New Deal relief program, and finds that more spending is received by counties with a larger share of informed voters which is measured as the share of households owning a radio. Methodologically, our paper is closely related to Strömberg´s. However, while in his paper the share of informed voters is determined by the diffusion of radio ownership across counties, we assume that these shares result from the behavior of a profit-maximizing media firm. Our theoretical analysis is guided by Strömberg (2004a) who delivers more general insights on the interaction between information and politics. In his model he sheds light on the characteristics which make a group more attractive for mass media. Since there is more coverage on issues concerning the attractive groups, the share of informed voters is larger in these groups which in turn results in more favorable policy. Besley and Burgess (2002) also consider the idea that a government is more responsive to its citizens when these are better informed. They test this idea on panel data from India and find that state governments provide more public food and calamity relief in hard times where newspaper circulation is higher.
In contrast to the last two papers, competing parties can directly influence the share of informed voters by campaigning in Schultz (2006) . Applying the LW-DL-model he presents characteristics of group members like swing voting or the likeliness to vote that lead to intensive campaigning for a group.
We analyze Designated Market Area (DMA) data to identify the media activity in a county. Such Data is used by Gentzkow (2006) who finds that the rise of television significantly accounts for the decline in voter turnout in the United States since the 1950s. Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder (2006) also use DMA data to examine the impact of television on the incumbency advantage in U.S. elections that has showed up since the late 1950s. There appears to be only a small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant effect of television on the incumbency advantage. Borck and Owings (2003) study the effect of politics on the distribution of intergovernmental grants in California. In their model lobbying by local governments determines essentially where the central government allocates grants. Assuming that the marginal costs of lobbying increase with the geographical distance to the state capital the model predicts that grants are lower in more distant counties. This hypothesis is confirmed by an empirical analysis of data from Californian counties.
The Model
At first, we show how the media sector affects the share of informed voters in the counties of a state. Subsequently this result will be used to explain strategic public spending by an incumbent seeking re-election.
The Media Sector
The news director of a representative television station needs to decide how to use limited airtime N in order to maximize profits. He can choose the amount of coverage from each county of the media market where the TV station is located. With n c as a county´s news space it follows that c n c = N.
(1)
Revenues come from advertising, where a denotes revenue per viewer. Additionally, we presume constant marginal costs of reporting from a county c, labeled γ c . Hence, the profit of the TV station, π, is
where φ c is the share of viewers and ρ c the population in a county c. We assume that φ increases with coverage φ > 0 and furthermore φ < 0, φ(N ) < 1, and φ (0) = ∞. Just as well, we assume that φ is identical for all counties so that φ c (n c ) = φ(n c ) ∀ c.
In order to maximize profit the news director solves the problem
subject to the airtime constraint (1).
Given an interior solution, the optimal allocation of coverage n * c satisfies the airtime constraint and the first order condition
with λ as the Lagrange multiplier for the air-time constraint.
Thus, in equilibrium, coverage from a county increases in ρ c and decreases in γ c . In other words, the television station broadcasts more news from counties with a larger population and less news from counties where reporting is more expensive. Bearing in mind that φ > 0 it follows that in equilibrium the share of viewers φ * c is larger in counties with a larger population and lower in counties that are farther away from the media center (higher γ c ).
Note that this describes the allocation of coverage in general. In the following, we assume that there is always coverage on activities of a prominent person like the incumbent, but, due to the calculus of television, the share of citizens who are aware of this differs among counties. Thus, in the next subsection, every viewer knows how much money was allocated to his county by the politician whereas non-viewers are not aware of the spending.
Voting and Strategic Allocation of Grants
In this section, we use the model from Strömberg (2004b) . We present a probabilistic voting model to highlight how an incumbent can spend his budget strategically across counties to improve the probability of re-election. The incumbent wins the election if he gets more than the half of all votes cast. He allocates total grants G across the counties in his state such that
where g c denotes grants per capita in county c. Since each citizen i in county c derives utility u c = u c (g c ) from grants and cares about ideological features of the incumbent his total utility is
where σ i is an individual ideological component and δ is the incumbent's general popularity in the electorate as a whole; both components are random variables and may be positive or negative. Now we can take our result from the last subsection and put pieces together. We assume that only an informed citizen i in county c knows that the incumbent is responsible for the grant allocation and takes it into account when casting his ballot. If citizen i goes voting then he will vote for the incumbent if his total utility under the incumbent´s regime has met some minimum standardū i :
and for the challenger otherwise. The dummy variable κ i equals one if citizen i is informed and zero if he is not informed. Recalling that the share of informed citizens in county c is φ c the probability that κ i = 1 is φ c .
We assume a special form of the utility function from Dixit and Londregan (1996) :
where ε > 0 captures the concavity of the utility function and the parameter k c affects the marginal utility of an extra dollar of grants. Note that u c is strictly concave with marginal utility falling from ∞ toward 0 when g is increased from 0 toward ∞. Evidently, since a higher k c raises u c for a given g the voters in a county with a higher k c are more responsive to grant money regarding their voting decision. Thus, k c measures how important grants are in relation to ideology.
To keep things simple we assume that σ i +ū i has a county-specific uniform distribution with mean m c and density ψ c . The higher ψ c , the larger is the number swing voters in the county. Let α c be voter turnout in county c so that V c , the number of votes for the incumbent in that county, is
Consequently, the incumbent wins the election if
Rearranging we obtain the equivalent expression
Apparently, for any allocation of grants it depends on the realization of the general popularity shock, δ, if (11) is satisfied and the incumbent wins the election. Contingent on grant allocation the probability P of re-election is given by
where Ω denotes the distribution function of δ.
The incumbent strives to maximize the probability to be re-elected by allocating grants strategically across counties. In equilibrium the optimal allocation of grants g * c satisfies the first-order condition
and the budget constraint. All insights the model can give about the incumbent´s incentives to allocate grants strategically are implied in equation (12) which means that, in equilibrium, the number of votes gained by an extra dollar is equal among counties. Recall that u c (g c ) is strictly concave and that the incumbent allocates his budget equally among counties. Then, an extra dollar buys more votes in counties, where α c , ψ c , k c and φ c are higher and these counties gain more grants. As u c decreases in g c the marginal gain of votes also decreases in g c .
Note that φ c = φ(n c (γ c , ρ c )) implies two effects on grant spending that solely arise from the media sector: counties with a larger population or less marginal costs of news production (i.e. closer to the center) get more coverage resulting in a larger share of informed voters, which in turn raises equilibrium spending in the county. Furthermore, the model predicts that equilibrium spending is higher in counties with many swing voters (ψ c ), higher voter turnout (α c ) and where the relative importance of grants as against ideology is higher (k c ).
Data and estimation approach
We now turn to the empirical anlysis of media impact on public spending. First, we present the empirical specification and data sources used in the estimation. The results section then discusses our findings.
Empirical Strategy
In the estimation we will be using a cross-section of counties across the 48 contiguous states of the United States of America 1 . The dependent variable chosen is the per capita amount of federal grants awarded to the respective counties in 2000. Since we set out to discover how the intensity of media activity shapes the spending decisions of politicians, we would ideally want to use spending the geographical distribution of which is completely at the politician's discretion as our left-hand-side variable. Even though governors enjoy quite a bit of budgetary power, such monies are hardly ever available to politicians. Quite the contrary, most grants are not freely distributed across counties but are rather distributed according to formulas that have been decided upon in the political process. Thus, one could easily arrive at the conclusion that funds are being distributed in some sort of 'just' manner because there is a formula that exactly determines the amount each jurisdiction is to receive. Such reasoning does not take into account that these formulas themselves are the outcome of a political process, where the actors try to bring federal grants to their jurisdiction and further distribute them. Among these actors are senators and governors. We assume that senators as well as governors are interested in maximizing the amount of federal dollars awarded to their state and then distribute them so as to maximize the probability of reelection. It is important, though, to realize that in addition to the formula setting process being influenced by politicians, not all grants are awarded via formulas. This leaves at least part of the federal grants at the discretion of either the federal government or the state government once grants have been awarded to a state to distribute among its constituencies. It can be argued, that aside from Governors and Senators influencing the distribution of grants, there are are many more political actors who follow their own political agenda, most notably members of Congress. For our purposes it does not matter whether it is the governor who distributes the money or Congress members who pull funds into their district. From a theoretical view, the governor will favor media cities, whereas members of Congress hailing from a media county generate more funds because they get more media coverage. An argument backing our choice of outcome measure comes from Levitt and Snyder (1997) , who distinguish between low-variation and high-variation federal expenditure and state that high-variation spending is more prone to manipulations by politicians and easier to claim credit for. High-variation spending is in essence defined as federal expenditure net of direct transfers to individuals and government procurement contracts, leaving federal programs often administered by state and local governments for examination. This definition is not far from the federal grants variable we are using, yet we choose to stick with the more clear-cut definition of federal grants. Thus, in order to explain the differences in federal grants per capita across communities, we use the following OLS baseline specification where we enter all left-and right-hand side variables but those defined as shares in natural logarithms:
where g c is the (log of) dollar amount of federal grants per capita awarded to county c.
The share of informed voters in a community is accounted for by variables included in vector φ c . These are the key variables in determining whether there is a connection between the intensity of media coverage and thus voter information and the geographical distribution of federal grant awards. As we have shown in the theoretical model, the politician will direct grants towards counties that are closer to the media cities, as they generate more media coverage than grants awarded to farther away counties. This is due to the fact that the TV station reporting on projects financed through grant awards can do so at a lower cost if the project is realized in the proximity of the station's studios. Hence, the first variable proxying for voter information is the (log of) distance from the county's population centroid to the nearest media center. Our definition of media centers is based on the Designated Market Areas (DMAs) stipulated by Nielsen Media Research. The United States is split up into 210 DMAs (shown in figure ? ?), which are made up of those counties that tend to watch the same TV stations 2 . DMAs can cross state borders and are named after the city or cities where most TV stations are located. Whenever there are multiple cities of importance for the media market, they enter the DMA name (e.g. the San Francisco DMA is called San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose). When this is the case, our distance variable measures distance to the nearest city appearing in the DMA name. The intuition behind this is that even though they may not constitute the largest agglomeration in the DMA, these places are classified as media cities and a politician's activity in these places will probably generate more attention than it would in other places. As these distances vary a great deal across states and even DMAs, we use a relative distance measure calculated as county c's distance to media center divided by the average distance of all counties included in the same DMA to their nearest media city. This seems reasonable, as TV stations divide their news time among events occuring within their own DMA 3 . We hypothesize the coefficient on the distance variable to bear a negative sign, implying decreasing effects of distance on the amount of grants received (see the results section for further discussion).
Though not explicitly modeled as a distance measure, the second variable in φ c essentially accounts for physical distance and thus transaction cost on behalf of media executives, too. It is the (log of) the number full-service TV stations licensed in the county under consideration. Aside from capturing zero distance to the nearest media outlet, it accounts for effects of having multiple outlets at one's disposal 4 . These full-service stations are made up in large part of affiliates of the four big networks ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX plus the PBS stations. There are a little over 700 entities which contain at least one fully licensed station, compared to a about 340 media cities. We expect this variable to be the stronger predictor of federal grant spending, because having at least one media outlet in the immediate vicinity will greatly increase chances of news being picked up on, even without being a Nielsen media city. Obviously, all media center counties are host to at least one TV station. Indeed, the log of distance and the log of the number of TV stations are highly collinear. Accordingly, we use the two variables interchangeably as indicators of the availability of media outlets.
As quite a few DMAs cross state borders, we add the share of DMA population living in the same state that county c belongs to and a dummy variable taking on value 1 if all media cities in the DMA are located in another state than county c. Both variables account for counties possibly being marginalized within their own DMA information-wise, because they are not an important enough target group for TV stations. The share of DMA population living in the same state as county c could, however, also be a measure for yardstick competition, as will be discussed later, thus possibly leading to higher grants awarded to the supposedly marginalized counties. Finally, the percentage of residents with at least a bachelor's degree is added as a control for informed voters.
Relative voter turnout in county c is measured in α c . As data on the number of persons registered to vote could not be obtained at county-level, we calculate turnout as the number of democratic and republican votes cast in the 1996 election divided by population of that year. We then divide this number by the average turnout in the state county c is located in. The assumption inherent to this transformation is that the governor's choice set is made up of all counties in the state. A high voter density ψ c is believed to induce higher levels of funding as well. We measure voter mobility as the number of times the majority in presidential elections in county c has shifted from 1980 to 1996 5 .
Controls for financial needs of a county and its population as well as politico-economic controls are included in vector k c . Hence, it measures the relative importance of federal grants to different groups in the population, as well as the relative success of different groups in acquiring federal grants through activities such as lobbying. The political variables we include are distance to the state capital relative to all other counties in the same state, the percentage of residents employed by the federal government and the percentage of residents employed by state and local government. While the percentage of government employees supposedly leads to higher grants per capita, the distance from the capital is believed to be negatively related to the ability to generate funds, e.g. due to higher lobbying costs (Borck and Owing 2003) . We also include a number of controls to account for the distribution of grants on the basis of formulas 6 . In addition to income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, share of females, percentage of high variables. The estimated coefficient β will therefore not represent an elasticity. β can be transformed into an elasticity ε as follows: ε = β · [x/(x + 1)], where x is the number of TV stations. 5 The log of mobility is calculated as log(majority shifts +1) for the same reasons stated earlier.
6 For a list of variables these formulas may contain, see Randsell (2004) . Most of them are highly collinear with income, so we choose not to include all of them. school dropouts, expenditure per capita, percentage of population under 24 and bank deposits per capita, we also add the Herfindahl index of ethnic fragmentation 7 , the ratio of mean to median income and the white percentage of the population 8 . All OLS estimations allow for clustering of standard errors by state and include population density, population, land area in square miles as well as state dummies. Full sample estimations include a dummy for whether the county is classified as a metropolitan/micropolitan area.
Omitted Variables and Endogeneity of TV Station Location
Even though in most settings one would like to make use of panel data for empirical estimations in order to minimize omitted variable bias, there is one important reason why we do not believe we would be able to identify the effects outlined in the model using this kind of data. The problem lies in the absolute and relative stationarity of our two key variables, respectively. Whereas the number of major TV stations licensed in a given county shows at least some, however limited, variation over time, the distance a county is located from the nearest media city is fixed. The only possible reasons for this distance to actually change would be (a) if a new media city emerges or a former one is not granted that status any longer or (b) if the DMA a county belongs to changes. Although (b) sometimes happens, we believe the variation in the data will be insufficient to identify any effects 9 . We are well aware of the limitations inherent to cross-sectional data, yet try to counter these problems through the use of state effects and 2SLS.
An obvious candidate to be concerned about when it comes to endogeneity is the number of TV stations. OLS estimates may be biased due to omitted variables that affect both the number of TV stations and the amount of grants a county receives per capita. This bias may go either way, depending on the direction of correlation of the omitted variable with the endogenous regressor as well as with the dependent variable. A possible omitted factor would be the presence of interest groups and lobying activity, or to be more precise, the presence of industries or groups of people that are well represented by interest groups. One could think of the agricultural sector or heavy industry as branches that have traditionally been successful in acquiring grants. Agricultural heavy counties tend to be rural, so often they aren't home to a TV station. Counties with heavy industry are located both in rural areas as well as in urban surroundings. For rural industrial counties the same reasoning as for agriculture applies. Urban counties with a higher share of heavy industry on the other hand are probably not the kind of urban counties where TV stations tend to locate, as they would rather emerge in a more service-industry oriented county in the same metro area. Hence, the omission of lobbying activity would introduce a downward bias in the OLS estimates.
A second issue we would like to address is measurement error in the number of TV stations. Data on TV stations is obtained from the FCC and TV stations are assigned to the county where the station is licensed or where the main transmitter is located. In most cases this will be identical with the county where the actual TV studio is located but sometimes the two locations do not coincide, causing the TV stations variable to be measured with error. As is well known from the literature, measurement error biases OLS estimates towards zero.
Finally, the location of TV stations may be endogenous to government spending, as they include PBS affiliates, which are funded by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB, which in turn is funded by the US federal government), federal and state governments 10 . Because these stations may tend to emerge or be placed for political reasons where spending is high, the use of OLS might lead us to overestimate the effect of having a TV station in the home county. The same is true, if network TV stations emerge where a large amount of grants is spent. This may happen, either because there is more to report on in these places or because politicians influence the licensing process in some way 11 .
Hence, we instrument the number of TV stations and the first stage equation estimated is:
where z c denotes the vector of instruments and the second stage is as in equation (14). We instrument the log TV station variable with two exogenous variables. The first is the log of the number of TV sets in a given county in 1960. This should capture, whether the audience was large enough for a station to be interested in locating there. The number of TV sets in 1960 is unlikely to be correlated with either grants in 2000 or some underlying variable measuring inherent political interest, as television did not serve as a major channel of distributing political information until the mid 1960s (Prior 2006) . It is also unlikely to be related to lobbying activity. The second instrument is the log of the number of low power (LP) TV stations that are not classified as Class-A (CA) and have a broadcasting power of less than 10kw 12 . We argue that many of these are local public access stations or other stations so low in reach and information content (hence they are neither classified CA nor have significant broadcasting power) that they cannot serve the governor in promoting his actions. Thus, their location cannot be contingent 10 CPB grants to local jurisdictions are excluded from our dependent variable. Around 2000, PBS received about $ 250 million per year from the CPB, $ 300 million from state governments, whereas federal grants and contracts accounted for $ 70 million. See http://www.cpb.org or http://www.newenglandfilm.com/news/ archives/00december/pbs.htm 11 Prior (2006) argues that politicians have only rarely tried to influence the licensing process, though. 12 CA stations are excluded, because they convey local information, otherwise they could not be classified CA. We exclude stations above 10kw, because they might have a reach large enough to make them an attractive outlet for politicians. The log is again calculated as (log of TV stations +1) in order to avoid generating a lot of missing values.
on public spending in county c or local voters' interest in county c's current affairs while their number is at the same time positively correlated with the number of full service TV stations. In a similar vein, these small TV stations are no more or less likely to be located in a successful lobbying county than in any other county.
Spatial Autocorrelation
There are good reasons to check for spatial dependencies in our data. Spatial autocorrelation induced by strategic interaction could be responsible for possible (dis-)similarities between grants awarded to neighboring counties. One reason for suspecting such effects would be yardstick competition. We would then expect spending between neighbors to be positively correlated. As yardstick competition essentially requires two governments that strategically interact, this may not be relevant in our setting, where the Governor decides on how to distribute grants across his state. Thus, grant spending in, say county A and B of the same state cannot be the outcome of strategic interaction but rather will be decided upon by a single person in order to maximize the number of votes, taking into account voters' reactions to a variation in the allocation of grants. This implies that the Governor's decisions are quite likely to be driven to a large extent by measurable population characteristics rather than policy interdependence. The only counties where such strategic interaction can occur are counties bordering another state. We already try to account for this fact by including the variable DMA home share in our estimations. This variable measures the percentage of the population in a county's DMA living in the same state the county under consideration belongs to. The higher the share living outside the home state, the more information about what is going on in the other state we expect TV stations to convey, thus creating yardstick competition. Even though we include this control and we do not feel the spatial dependence in our setting to be a mainly strategic one, in order to account for border counties, we estimate a spatial lag regression model which can be displayed in matrix form as follows:
where ε is a vector of i.i.d. error terms, g is a vector representing grant spending, W is a spatial weight matrix, β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and W g gives the measure of grant spending in neighboring counties. The interaction between own and neighbors' spending is captured in the coefficient to be estimated, ρ, which we would then expect to have a positive sign. Another reason for the choice of the spatial lag model could be spillovers which we may not be able to capture in the baseline specification. In this case, the spatial correlation, as expressed in ρ may point in either direction.
A more suitable rationale for spatial correlation in our context would be locally correlated shocks or the existence of spatially correlated omitted variables which drive the governor's choice of local spending. In both cases the spatial interdependence is relegated to the error term, yielding the following spatial error model appropriate:
where the notation differs from above in that ε is a vector of spatially autocorrelated error terms, u is a vector of i.i.d. error terms and λ is the parameter measuring the extent of spatial autocorrelation.
It must be pointed out that both models will be estimated as a robustness check rather than as a means of determining what mechanism is responsible for possible spatial dependencies 13 . Our interest is mainly in determining whether the main media related variables distance to media city and log number of TV stations pick up some of the spatial effects and whether standard errors may be biased downwards in the OLS specification due to the neglect of spatial effects.
Data Sources
The data mentioned above is gathered from a variety of sources. While the dependent variable federal grants per capita is taken from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), many sociodemographic controls stem from the County Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain data for the actual time period under consideration, yet we believe that given the little variation in the data over time mentioned above, this does not hurt the quality of our results too much. The number of votes cast for Republican and Democrat party in the presidential elections from 1980 to 1996 is taken from the USA Counties 1998 CD published by the US Census Bureau. This data was combined with the intercensal population estimates (provided by the same source) in order to calculate vote shares of the Republican and Democrat party in the presidential elections as well as voter turnout and voter mobility (density 5 Empirical Results
The Link between media activity and spending
We employ three different samples to estimate our model. A full sample of counties, containing 2993 observations, a subset of micropolitan and metropolitan counties and an even smaller dataset consisting of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) counties only ( Figure ? ? shows counties by sample, where MSA counties are nested within the Metro/Micro sample and the Metro/Micro sample is contained in the full sample). 15 The main reason is that rural and nonrural counties may not be comparable because rural counties receive more grants per capita due to effects we may not be able to control for. These may include scale effects, minimum grants per county leading to higher per capita grants in less populous counties, overrepresentation in the political process or flat rate grants per county. Even though we control for a number of urbanity measures such as metro/micro classification, ethnic fractionalization, population density and population, we want to rule out the possibility of measuring urban-rural differences in grant spending in our media variables. Descriptive statistics in table ??, ?? and ?? show that (a) MSA counties are closest to media centers followed by the MSA/Micro sample. Distance ratios are largest in the full sample, implying large distance ratios on rural counties, (b) the raw correlation between grants and distance is negative in the MSA and MSA/Micro samples, yet positive in the full sample, and (c) rural counties indeed receive larger amounts of grants per capita. We take this as a hint, that the relationship probably differs across samples. A good reason as to why a log-log model could be in order is that the effect of distance may diminish with increasing distance (i.e. expenses are incurred whenever news happens farther away, whether the production team travels 50 or 100 miles doesn't really matter). In this specification, a negative coefficient on distance indicates a negative but levelling off relationship. In a similar vein, increases in the number of TV stations may yield decreasing gains in grants, as the effect of the first and second (i.e. introduction of competition) TV station certainly differs from the influence of the tenth station. The results of the OLS regressions using the number of TV stations as our measure of media coverage are shown in table ??. Column (1) displays coefficients for the full sample of counties. Having TV stations in the county leads to higher grant awards, yet the effect decreases in the number of stations. As mentioned above, the elasticity can be calculated as β·[x/(x+1)], so that the loss of the only TV station in a county incurs a drop in grants per capita of approximately 2.5% and an increase from 10 to 11 stations generates [10 · 10/11] · 0.048 = 0.44% more grants per capita. This finding is in line with theory. Somewhat surprising is, that a higher home state share in county i's DMA leads to lower grant awards, yet it is consistent with the idea of yardstick competition. The sign on out-of-state counties is as expected, yet insignificant. All of the political and most of the socio-economic variables are significant and have the expected signs 16 . Next, we consider the two subsamples. MSA counties as well as micropolitan area counties are included in the sample in column (2). Again there is a highly significant effect of number of media outlets on grants received. Column (3) contains results for counties classified as belonging to a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Within this urban sample, the effect of harboring a TV station matches the result we found before. The magnitude of the effect is similar in all three samples, with a pseudo-elasticity β of around 0.05.
The results obtained when distance to the nearest media city is employed as our measure of media activity are displayed in table ? ?. Once more, the estimation results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. The coefficient on distance is highly significant in the full sample (1) and the metro/micro sample (2) yet only marginally significant in the small MSA sample (3). The coefficients decrease in magnitude moving from the full sample to the MSA sample.
Where the full sample predicts that a county located twice as far away from the nearest media city as the average county in the DMA receives 3.4% less in grants per capita, this effect is 3.1% in the metro/micro sample and 2.7% in the MSA sample. All the other variables' coefficients resemble those in table ? ?.
In sum, we find the hypothesized effect of both our key variables in all subsamples leading us to conclude that counties less exposed to media coverage receive less attention when grants are distributed. We take this as evidence that a vote-maximizing politicians' rationale does favor counties where media activity is high.
2SLS results
In this section we address the possibility that TV station location is a function of grant spending or that TV station location as well as grant spending are influenced by some underlying variable in the error term. The reasoning for our instruments has been laid out in ??, table ?? displays the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results. In the full sample (1), the coefficient of having a TV station is much higher than in the OLS estimations and thus confirms that we largely underestimated the effect of having one or more television stations at virtually zero distance. Note, however, that the coefficient of 0.33 means that the loss of the only TV station leads to a cut in grants by around 16% while an increase from 10 to 11 stations leads to a gain of 3% in federal funding.
Things are similar in the Metro/Micro (2) and the MSA sample (3), where the coefficient on TV stations is of the expected sign, yet smaller than in the full sample. Finally, all first stage F-statistics indicate relevant instruments, and the Hansen tests indicate that our instruments are exogenous in all samples. 
Spatial regression results
Checking whether our results are contaminated by spatial effects, we find that they do not change as much as one might expect, even though we do find highly significant spatial correlation. Most importantly, both our media variables remain virtually unaltered in comparison to the OLS results. Table ? ? displays the estimations for spatial lag models (Column 1 and 3) as well as spatial error models (Column 2 and 4). Estimations are carried out on the full sample only 17 .
The number of TV stations remains highly significant in both the lag (1) and the error (2) specification. The robust LM multipliers however favor the error model, as do the Wald, LM and LR statistics 18 . The error model is also a better fit, as indicated by the higher log likelihood. We find highly significant positive spatial correlation in both models, yet the inclusion of the spatial parameters leaves the effect of TV stations unchanged in the lag specification and causes merely a small drop in the (preferred) error model.
Things are not very different in the case of the distance to media center variable. Again, the error specification (4) is preferred over the spatial lag model (3), considering the fit and robust LM multipliers which indicate no significant lag effect in the presence of spatially correlated error terms. The negative effect of distance is the about same as in the OLS specification in both models (3 and 4).
As was explained earlier, the discussion as to what are the factors underlying the spatial correlation is beyond the scope of this paper, so we are content with being able to state that the significance in both media activity variables cannot be an artefact of spatial dependencies.
Conclusion
This paper set out to analyze the effects of geographical distance from media outlets on federal grant spending. We found strong support for our theoretical predictions in the measure of distance to media outlets and media density combined, the number of TV stations. The effect of distance to the nearest media city is in the hypothesized direction in all our samples as well, with the effect being largest in the full sample. Neither of these effects is confounded with spatial dependencies. Endogeneity on the other hand seems to be a problem when it comes to estimating the effect of the number of TV stations on grants received. We massively underestimate the coefficient in the OLS specifications. Even if one were to doubt the validity of our instruments, the direction of the effect is in the hypothesized direction in OLS, albeit of smaller magnitude. Still, at a rate of approximately $1,000 per capita even a gain or loss of around 2% in grants per capita amounts to a large sum for a county harboring, say, 100,000 inhabitants, not to speak of the effects estimated via 2SLS. Being located far away from the media center leads to lower grants as well, yet the effect seems to be somewhat smaller, considering that most counties aren't located farther than twice the average distance from the nearest media center. It doesn't matter, however, which effect is stronger, as both measure distance to media outlets (with the number of TV stations measuring an additional effect of media density). In terms of robustness and magnitude our results strongly suggest that the intensity of media activity matters to politicians and influences the geographical distribution of federal grants.
We did not try to uncover the reasons for the highly significant spatial effects. As stated earlier, apart from spatially correlated shocks or omitted variables that take on similar values in neighboring counties, the rationale for suspecting such effects could be either yardstick competition or spillovers in the provision of public goods.
